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THIS COURT, THAT LAW
Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.
747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
STEVEN R. TRYBUS*
The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 19821 created the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC).2 The Act gave the CAFC juris-
diction over appeals from district court decisions 3 whenever the jurisdic-
tion of the district court was based in whole or in part on the patent
laws.4 Congress created the Federal Circuit to ensure uniformity in the
interpretation of the patent laws of the United States.5 Congress was
concerned, however, about four potential problem areas: bifurcation of
appeals, 6 specialization of the Federal Circuit, 7 forum shopping in non-
patent issues,8 and appropriation by the Federal Circuit of areas of law
not assigned to it.9 Rather than resolving these issues, Congress indi-
cated that the court should formulate appropriate jurisdictional stan-
dards in cases involving patent and non-patent issues.10
The Federal Circuit squarely addressed these issues in Atari, Inc. v.
JS&A Group, Inc..11 Atari asserted that the CAFC did not have jurisdic-
tion over the appeal filed by JS&A because the appeal was of a prelimi-
nary injunction based solely on copyright infringement. 12 The court
* B.S. Ch.E., Illinois Institute of Technology, 1982; Candidate for J.D., lIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law, 1986. The author wishes to thank the firm of Neuman, Williams, Anderson &
Olson for their support in the research of this article.
1. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
2. Hereinafter referred to as the "Federal Circuit" or the "CAFC."
3. See infra note 47 for the complete jurisdictional reach of the CAFC. This comment focuses
on the jurisdiction of the CAFC granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1982). For the full text of § 1295(a)(1), see infra note 69.
5. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
11, 15 [hereinafter "SENATE REPORT"].
6. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 53 and 54 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
10. "The Committee intends for the jurisdictional language to be construed in accordance with
the objectives of the Act." SENATE REPORT supra note 5 at 20, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 30.
11. 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
12. Id. at 1427.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
denied Atari's motion to transfer the appeal to the Seventh Circuit. 13
With the help of supplemental briefs by the parties and ten amici briefs, 14
the court determined that the appeal to the CAFC was proper because
the district court's jurisdiction was based, in part, on the patent laws. 15
Construing the statute and looking to the legislative history, the
CAFC determined it had "arising under" jurisdiction over the entire
case, 16 even though the appeal involved only a copyright issue. The
court stated that the jurisdiction of the CAFC was determined as of the
time that the complaint was filed. 17 In addition, the court held that ques-
tions of non-patent law are to be determined on the basis of the estab-
lished, discernable law of the regional circuit in which the district court
sits. 18
This comment examines the historical background which led to the
creation of the CAFC. It then discusses the facts of Atari and the reason-
ing of the court. Next, the court's reasoning is analyzed with reference to
the statute and legislative history to show that the decision in this case is
appropriate. Other jurisdictional tests which have been proposed are ex-
amined and criticized. Finally, some possible jurisdictional problems are
examined and the Atari test is applied to determine the likely results.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The idea of creating a single forum to hear patent cases has been
considered many times.19 The origins of the CAFC date back at least ten
years. A major attempt to reform the federal judicial system was begun
in the early 1970's. Two primary concerns were Supreme Court docket
congestion and the inability of the regional courts of appeals to uniformly
adjudicate issues of national law. 20
13. Id. at 1440.
14. Briefs were filed by amici: United States Trademark Association; Bar Association of the
District of Columbia; Ad Hoc Committee of Antitrust Lawyers; Committee of Law and Technology
of the Boston Bar Association; the Copyright Office; American Intellectual Property Law Associa-
tion; Committee on Patents of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York; Virginia State
Bar, Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section; Orange County Patent Law Association; and Boston
Patent Law Association. See supra notes 105-119 and accompanying text. See also Kingdon and
Moradian, 'Atari' Clarifies Non-Patent Claims Jurisdiction, The Legal Times of Washington, Feb. 18,
1985 at 15, for a discussion of the differing views advocated by the amici.
15. Atari at 1432-33.
16. Id. at 1433.
17. Id. at 1431-32.
18. Id. at 1439-40.
19. Lever, The New Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit (Part 1), 64 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 178,
186 (1982).
20. Lever, supra note 19, at 186; Petrowitz, Federal Court Reform: The Federal Courts Im-
provement Act of 1982-And Beyond, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 543, 544 (1983).
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The push for federal court reform began in earnest in 1971 when
Chief Justice Burger established the Freund Committee to investigate the
caseload of the Court and offer recommendations for reform.21 In 1972,
the Freund Committee issued a report recommending a National Court
of Appeals. 22 The suggested court would have controlled the Supreme
Court docket by reviewing all petitions to the Supreme Court.23 In addi-
tion, the court was to decide, on the merits, cases of true conflicts be-
tween the circuits. 24 The committee rejected the idea of specialized
courts because it felt that these courts would do little to relieve Supreme
Court congestion. 25 The Freund Report was widely criticized,26 and the
reforms suggested never materialized.
Creation of the Hruska Commission was the Congress' next attempt
21. See Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. More Than A National Patent
Court, 49 Mo. L. REV. 43, 47 (1984). The committee, chaired by Professor Paul Freund of the
Harvard Law School, was known as the Freund Committee. The other members of the committee
were: Professor Alexander M. Bickel of Yale Law School; Peter D. Ehrenhaft, of the D.C. Bar; Dr.
Russell D. Niles, Director of the Institute of Judicial Administration; Bernard G. Segal, of the Phila-
delphia Bar; Robert L. Stern of the Chicago Bar; and Charles Allan Wright of the University of
Texas Law School.
22. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASE LOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT, 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972) [hereinafter "FREUND REPORT"]. The court was to be
staffed with seven judges. The judges were to be drawn from the list of the judges who were serving
on the circuit courts of appeals. The names of the chief judges as well as the names of the judges
with less than five years experience were to be stricken from the list. First, the most senior judge,
then the most junior, then the next most senior and next most junior and so on were to be chosen
except that no two judges were to be from the same regional circuit. The judges were to serve
staggered three year terms. Id. at 591.
23. The committee assumed that the National Court would refer approximately 400 cases per
year to the Supreme Court for further screening. Id. at 593.
24. The National Court was to decide all cases of true conflicts between the circuits, except
those which were important enough to refer to the Supreme Court. Id. at 590-91. The decisions of
the National Court were to be final and not reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
could, however, grant certiorari before a judgment by the National Court or before the National
Court denied certiorari, thus preserving the Supreme Court's ability to review those cases which it
felt were deserving of Supreme Court review. Id. at 593.
25. Id. at 585-86. The committee discussed specialized courts in the areas of taxation, labor,
and administrative law. Aside from the minimal impact on the Supreme Court docket which these
courts would have had, the committee was concerned about the risks of such courts.
There would be a loss of the judicial perspective afforded by a broader range of review, and
inconsistencies would develop among various specialized appellate tribunals in resolving
pervasive, common problems of administrative justice. Moreover, there is the possibility
that in dealing with a narrow subject-matter the judges might form polarized blocs; and
that, as a corollary, there might be a politicization of the appointing process around a
single set of issues.
Id. at 585. See infra note 34 and accompanying text for a similar concern expressed by the Hruska
Commission.
26. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 49-54 (1973); Alsup,
A Policy Assessment of the National Court of Appeals, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1313 (1974); Brennan,
Justice Brennan Calls National Court of Appeals Proposal 'Fundamentally Unnecessary and Ill Ad-
vised', 59 A.B.A. J. 835 (1973); Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A. J.
253 (1973); Note, The National Court of Appeals: A Qualified Concurrence, 62 GEo. L.J. 881 (1974).
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at reform. 27 The Commission's work was divided into two parts: first, a
study of the geographical boundaries of the existing circuits;28 second, a
study of the structure and internal procedures of the federal appellate
system.29 Like the Freund Committee, the Hruska Commission sug-
gested the formation of a National Court of Appeals. This version of the
National Court was not to review petitions to the Supreme Court, but
was only to decide cases on the merits. These cases were to be referred to
the National Court by the Supreme Court or transferred to it by the
regional courts of appeals.30
The Commission found that the major problem of the federal appel-
late court system was its inability to provide definite, uniform answers on
issues of national law. 31 This lack of uniformity created forum shopping.
The Commission also found that forum shopping was especially preva-
lent in the area of patent law.32 Nevertheless, it specifically rejected a
special court of patent appeals. 33 The Commission concluded that the
27. Created in October, 1972, under the name Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807 (1972), the Commission was established for
fifteen months. Pub. L. No. 93-420, 88 Stat. 1153 (1974), extended the life of the Commission to
twenty-four months. The Commission consisted of sixteen members, four appointed by the Presi-
dent, four by the Speaker of the House, four by the President pro tempore of the Senate, and four by
the Chief Justice. The members designated Senator Roman Hruska to serve as chairman; therefore
the Commission was known as the Hruska Commission. The other members of the Commission
were: Judge J. Edward Lumbard of the Second Circuit (vice chairman); Senators Quentin Burdick,
Hiram Fong, and John McClellan; Congressmen Jack Brooks, Walter Flowers, Edward Hutchinson,
and Charles Wiggins; Emanuel Celler; Dean Roger Cramton; Francis Kirkman; Judge Roger Robb;
Bernard Segal; Judge Alfred T. Sulmonetti; and Professor Herbert Wechsler. Professor A. Leo
Levin was executive director of a support staff.
28. In December 1973, the Commission recommended that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits be
either subdivided or split to form two new circuits. See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FED-
ERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL
CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973). Acting on the
recommendations of the Commission, Congress split the Fifth Circuit and created the Eleventh
Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 44(a) & 48 (1982). Congress has not yet altered the boundaries of the
Ninth Circuit.
29. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195
(1975) [hereinafter "HRUSKA REPORT"].
30. The court was to hear two types of cases, "transfer" cases from the courts of appeals and
"reference" cases from the Supreme Court. The circuit courts of appeals were to transfer cases to
the National Court when: (1) an immediate nationwide decision was in the public interest; (2) an
issue of federal law was raised and there were inconsistent decisions on the point and the advantages
of having the National Court hear the case outweighed the disadvantages; or (3) a previous decision
of the National Court needed to be interpreted. The Supreme Court would have had four possible
dispositions of a petition for certiorari: (1) grant the petition and hear the case; (2) deny the petition;
(3) deny the petition but refer the case to the National Court for a decision; or (4) deny the petition
but give the National Court discretion to hear the case. Id. at 236-47.
3 1. Id. at 209-34.
32. Id. at 220.
33. Id. at 236.
734
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problems of specialized courts outweighed their possible benefits. 34  In
addition, the Commission was concerned about areas other than patent
law. While some of the recommendations of the Hruska Report were
adopted by Congress35 the concept of the National Court of Appeals was
again criticized36 and was not adopted.3 7
Discussions about the formation of a CAFC-type court were re-
ported in 1977 and 1978. A Committee on Revision of the Federal Judi-
cial System, appointed in 1975 by Attorney General Levi, issued a report
which rejected the concept of a National Court of Appeals in favor of
specialized courts in the problem areas of tax and patent law.38 In 1977,
the Justice Department created the Office for Improvements in the Ad-
ministration of Justice (OIAJ). In June, 1978, the OIAJ issued a memo-
randum proposal which called for the merger of the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims into a national court to hear
patent, civil tax and environmental appeals. 39
34. Id. at 234-36. The Commission considered specialized courts in the tax, patent, environ-
mental, criminal and administrative law areas. Rejecting the concept of specialized courts, the Com-
mission stated that "the quality of decision-making would suffer as the specialized judges become
subject to 'tunnel vision,' seeing the cases in a narrow perspective without the insights stemming
from a broad exposure to legal problems in a variety of fields." Id. at 234-35. Also, the Commission
felt that judges "might impose their own views of policy," rather than interpreting the law. Id. at
235. See supra note 25 regarding similar concerns by the Freund committee.
In the patent area, the Commission observed that a survey of practioners, conducted by Profes-
sor J. Gambrell and D. Dunner, showed that the patent bar was sharply divided on the issue. The
Commission also heard testimony of a strong preference by a majority of the judges on the Seventh
Circuit to retain patent jurisdiction in the regional courts. The Commission found this evidence
especially persuasive since the Seventh Circuit had the heaviest patent caseload. Id. at 236.
35. The Fifth Circuit was split into the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, see supra note 28; the
tenure of chief judges and the precedence of senior judges was changed, 28 U.S.C. §§ 45, 136 (1982);
and 152 additional federal judgeships, 35 at the appellate level, were created. See Omnibus Judge-
ship Act, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978).
36. See, e.g., Haworth, Circuit Splitting and the "New" National Court of Appeals: Can the
Mouse Roar?, 38 Sw. L.J. 839 (1976); Owens, The Hruska Commission's Proposed National Court of
Appeals, 23 UCLA L. REV. 580 (1976).
A very comprehensive article on both the Freund and Hruska reports was written by Judge
Leventhal of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Leventhal, A Modest Propo-
sal for a Multi-Circuit Court ofAppeals, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 881 (1975). Judge Leventhal suggested a
national court of appeals at the same level as the regional courts of appeals. This court would have
heard cases referred to it by the Supreme Court and the regional courts of appeals. The cases would
have been limited to areas where a uniform national rule is important such as tax, labor, patent,
environmental and securities law.
37. The concept of a national court has been resurrected. The latest recommendation in this
area, the Intercircuit Panel, was suggested by the Chief Justice at the midyear meeting of the Ameri-
can Bar Association. The suggestion was for a five-year experiment. The Supreme Court would
select one judge from each of the thirteen courts of appeals. Nine of these judges, drawn by lot,
would sit twice a year for two weeks to decide intercircuit conflicts and to interpret federal statutes.
The cases would be referred to the panel by the Supreme Court. Burger, The Time is Now for the
Intercircuit Panel, 71 A.B.A. J. 86 (April, 1985).
38. REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMMITrEE ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM, (1977).
39. OFFICE FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUS-
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In 1979, the 96th Congress considered legislation to improve the
structure and administration of the federal courts. Two bills were intro-
duced in the Senate.40 In their initial form, the Senate bills created the
CAFC, granting it jurisdiction over patent and trademark cases. The
bills also included a new United States Court of Tax Appeals. 41 As the
bills progressed, the Court of Tax Appeals was dropped, as was the
trademark jurisdiction of the CAFC.42 Senator Bumper's threat to add a
non-germane amendment prevented passage of the final compromise ver-
sion by the 96th Congress. 43 The bill was withdrawn and not resched-
uled for a vote. 44 In 1981, the legislation was introduced to the 97th
Congress in substantially the same form as the final bill before the 96th
Congress. 45  Hearings were held and minor amendments were made.
46
The bill became law on April 2, 1982.4 7
The legislative history indicates that Congress had three main pur-
poses in creating the CAFC: first, to reduce the workload of the courts
TICE, A PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE THE FEDERAL APPELLATE SYSTEM, reprinted in PAT. TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 389 at D-1 (August 3, 1978). For a discussion of the proposal
see, Meador, A Proposal For A New Federal Intermediate Appellate Court, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 665
(1978).
40. S. 677, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 2869 (1979); S. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
125 CONG. REC. 2854-55 (1979).
41. S. 677 differed from S. 678 which removed all tax jurisdiction from the Claims Court and
placed all appellate tax jurisdiction in the new United States Court of Tax Appeals.
42. The bills were reintroduced as S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 13, 876-77
(1979). The House counterpart was H.R. 3806, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H8775-83
(daily ed. Sept. 15, 1980).
43. The amendment would have eliminated the presumption of validity that a rule promulgated
by an administrative agency is afforded during a judicial review of the rule. See 126 CONG. REC.
28,106-10 (1980).
44. See Lever, supra note 19, at 192-95; Petrowitz, supra note 20, at 551-52.
45. S. 21, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 531-40 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1981).
46. The bill was reported out of committee as S. 1700, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC.
514, 710-20 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1981). The House version was H. 4482, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., (1981).
See, SENATE REPORT supra note 5 at 1-2, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 11-12.
47. The House bill was amended to contain the language of the Senate bill and was passed by
the House on March 9, 1982. The Senate then passed the House bill on March 22, 1982. The
President signed the legislation on April 2, 1982.
The CAFC's jurisdiction is defined in various sections of title 28 of the United States Code.
"The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the
jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
Section 1292(c) provides that:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive juris-
diction-
(1) of an appeal from an interlocutory order or decree described in subsection (a) or
(b) of this section in any case over which the court would have jurisdiction of an appeal
under section 1295 of his title; and
(2) of an appeal from a judgment in a civil action for patent infringement which
would otherwise be appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit and is final except for an accounting.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(c) (1982). Section 1292(d) provides for appeals from interlocutory orders of the
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of appeals; 4 second, to obtain nationwide uniformity in the interpreta-
tion of the patent laws; 49 and third, to more efficiently utilize available
judicial resources. 50  The legislative history also shows that Congress
wanted to avoid four possible problem areas: bifurcation of appeals, spe-
cialization of the court, forum shopping in non-patent issues, and appro-
priation by the CAFC of non-patent issues.
Congress rejected the idea that the CAFC have jurisdiction over ap-
peals of patent issues, whether the issues were raised as claims or as de-
fenses. Instead, the statute was written to give the CAFC jurisdiction
over entire cases. Congress felt that it was important not to give the
CAFC 'issue' jurisdiction because that would lead to bifurcation of ap-
peals5' and specialization of the CAFC. 52 The possibility that appeals
Court of International Trade and the United States Claims Court. Section 1295 provides for the
CAFC to have exclusive jurisdiction:
(1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court when the district court's jurisdiction
was based, in whole or in part, on the patent laws, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1982);
(2) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court when the district court's jurisdiction
was based on Section 1346 of title 28, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) (1982);
(3) of an appeal from a final decision of the United States Claims Court, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(3) (1982);
(4) of an appeal from a decision of the Board of Appeals or the Board of Patent Interferences
of the Patent and Trademark Office with respect to patent applications and interferences, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(4)(A) (1981);
(5) of an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks or the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board with respect to applications for registration of marks, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(4)(B) (1982);
(6) of an appeal from a decision of a district court to which a case was directed pursuant to
section 145 or 146 of title 35, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(C) (1982);
(7) of an appeal from a final decision of the United States Court of International Trade, 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1982);
(8) to review final determinations of the United States International Trade Commission relat-
ing to unfair practices in import trade made under section 1337 of title 19, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6)
(1982);
(9) to review, by appeal on questions of law only, findings of the Secretary of Commerce under
headnote 6 to schedule 8, part 4, of the Tariff Schedules of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(7)
(1982);
(10) of an appeal from decisions under section 71 of the Plant Variety Protection Act (Pub. L.
No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2461), 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(B) (1982);
(11) of an appeal of a final order or final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board,
pursuant to sections 7703(b)(1) and 7703(d) of title 5, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (1982); and
(12) of an appeal from a final decision of an agency board of contract appeals pursuant to
section B(g)(l) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978)
codified at 41 U.S.C. § 607(g)(1)), 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(10) (1982).
In addition, the head of any executive department or agency may, with the approval of the
Attorney General, refer to the CAFC for judicial review, any final decision rendered by a board of
contract appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(b) (1982).
48. H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1981) (hereinafter "HousE REPORT").
49. HOUSE REPORT supra note 48 at 20-23; SENATE REPORT supra note 5 at 2, 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 12.
50. HOUSE REPORT supra note 48 at 24. See generally D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 11.06(3)(e)(i)
(1985), for a discussion of the congressional intent.
51. HOUSE REPORT supra note 48 at 41 (contrasting the CAFC jurisdiction with that of the
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would be bifurcated was eliminated by giving the CAFC jurisdiction over
the entire case. Also, because the CAFC will rule on issues other than
patent law, the CAFC is a less specialized court.
Congress also discussed forum shopping, noting that the creation of
the CAFC was designed to alleviate forum shopping in patent cases and
not to create forum shopping on non-patent issues. 53 To eliminate forum
shopping, Congress encouraged district court judges to use their power
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to separate trivial or frivolous
patent claims from non-patent claims.54 Congress indicated that where a
patent claim was pled solely to manipulate appellate jurisdiction, appeals
from decisions on the non-patent claims should be heard by the appropri-
ate regional court of appeals.
Congress also reminded the CAFC that it was not to appropriate for
itself elements of federal law not assigned to it statutorily. The legislative
history contains a warning to the CAFC that it should follow the estab-
lished canon of strict jurisdictional construction. 55
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA) which had been held to have only issue jurisdic-
tion and to require bifurcated appeals in Coastal States Mktg. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604
F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1979)).
52. "While the suggestion has been made that this objective [uniformity in patent law] might be
accomplished simply by expanding the jurisdiction of the [Court of Customs and Patent Appeals],
the committee rejected such an approach as being inconsistent with the imperative of avoiding undue
specialization within the Federal judicial system." SENATE REPORT supra note 5 at 6, 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 16. See supra notes 25 and 34 for this same concern by the Freund
committee and the Hruska Commission.
53. The SENATE REPORT indicated that:
The Committee is concerned that the exclusive jurisdiction over patent claims of the
new Federal Circuit not be manipulated. This measure is intended to alleviate the serious
problem of forums [sic] shopping among the regional courts of appeals on patent claims by
investing exclusive jurisdiction in one court of appeals. It is not intended to create forum
shopping opportunities between the Federal Circuit and the regional courts of appeals on
other claims.
SENATE REPORT supra note 5 at 19-20, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 29-30.
54. According to the SENATE REPORT:
Federal District judges are encouraged to use their authority under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, see Rules 13(i), 16, 20(b), 42(b), 54(b), to ensure the integrity of the juris-
diction of the federal court of appeals by separating final decisions on claims involving
substantial antitrust issues from trivial patent claims, counterclaims, crossclaims or third
party claims raised to manipulate appellate jurisdiction.
The Committee intends for the jurisdictional language to be constued in accordance
with the objectives of the Act and these concerns. If, for example, a patent claim is
manipulatively joined to an antitrust action but severed or dismissed before final decision of
the antitrust claim, jurisdiction over the appeal of the antitrust claim should not be
changed by this Act but should rest with the regional court of appeals.
Id. at 20, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 30 (emphasis added).
55. The Senate warned that:
Concern has been expressed that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will
appropriate for itself elements of Federal law under its section 1295(a)(1) grant ofjurisdic-
tion. . . . [I]t is a canon of construction that courts strictly construe their jurisdiction.
Therefore, the committee is confident that the present language will not pose undue
difficulties.
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ATARI, INC v. JS&A GROUP, INC
FACTS OF THE CASE
Atari manufactures and distributes a home video game system
known as the Atari 2600. Atari also manufactures and distributes game
cartridges for use with the 2600. The computer program in the cartridge,
which is embedded in a computer chip, controls the play of the game.
The chips in the Atari cartridges are Read Only Memory (ROM) which
can be neither reprogrammed nor erased. Atari copyrighted the car-
tridge programs as audiovisual works. Atari also sought to register a
copyright for one of the game programs.5 6
JS&A, an electronics retailer, began marketing its Prom Blaster de-
vice and blank cartridges for use with the device in the fall of 1983. This
device allowed a consumer to make a duplicate copy of a 2600-type car-
tridge onto a blank cartridge. JS&A marketed the device as a way to
make back-up copies of 2600-type games. JS&A also sold game car-
tridges and granted the right to copy and sell those games to the purchas-
ers of Prom Blasters.57
Atari filed suit against JS&A alleging contributory copyright in-
fringement,5 8 patent infringement, 59 unfair competition under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a), 60 deceptive trade practices, fraud, state unfair competition,
Id. at 19, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 29.
56. Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 6-7 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
57. Id. at 7.
58. Section 106 of the Copyright Act defines the rights of the copyright owner. "Subject to
sections 107 through 118, the owner of the copyright under this title has the exclusive right to do
and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies" 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 (1982). "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided
by sections 106 through 118, . . . is an infringer of the copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)(1982).
Since JS&A's customers and not JS&A would be doing the copying, JS&A was not directly
infringing. However, "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materi-
ally contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' in-
fringer." Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted), quoted in Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 7-8 (N.D.
I1. 1983).
59. Atari alleged that the 8K blank cartridges made by JS&A infringed Atari's U.S. Patent No.
4,368,515 for an invention entitled "Bank Switchable Memory System".
60. Known more popularly as section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the section is entitled "False
designations of origin and false descriptions forbidden" and is referred to as the federal law of unfair
competition.
(a) Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods
or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any
false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to
describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into com-
merce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin
or description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or used in
commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a
civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or
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and misappropriation. 6' The district court granted a preliminary injunc-
tion enjoining JS&A's contributory copyright infringement. 62 Atari
moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 13(i) and 42(b) for an
order separating the patent count for trial and judgment. The sole pur-
pose for this motion was Atari's desire that any appeal from the copy-
right injunction be brought before the Seventh Circuit and not the
Federal Circuit.63 The district court granted Atari leave to separate the
patent count.64
JS&A filed notice of appeal of the preliminary injunction order in
the Federal Circuit. Atari moved to transfer the appeal to the Seventh
Circuit, alleging that the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction to hear the
in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
61. Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
62. 597 F. Supp. at 10-11. Atari had moved for a preliminary injunction based solely on the
contributory copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) gives the court authority to issue such an
injunction. JS&A defended, arguing that the activity of copying 2600-type cartridges was not an
infringement because of a statutory exception for archival copies. 597 F. Supp. at 8.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner
of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or
adaptation of that computer program provided:
(2) that any such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all
archival copies are destroyed in the event that the continued possession of the computer
program should cease to be rightful.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
The court found that the purpose of the exception was to protect against destruction or damage
by mechanical or electrical failure. The only dangers in this case were physical because the pro-
grams were embedded in ROMs and therefore the district court concluded that the section 117
exception did not apply. 597 F. Supp. at 9. Because the archival exception did not apply, the court
granted the preliminary injunction.
63. The motion on its face indicates Atari's desire.
4. The purpose of this motion is to ensure that appeals from this Court's orders
relating to the patent claim, Count II, go to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
and that appeals from those orders relating to other claims under the Complaint go to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. As the legislative history for the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit states: 'Federal District judges are encouraged to
use their authority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Rules 13(i), 16, 20(b),
42(b), to ensure the integrity of the jurisdiction of the federal court of appeals. . . .' ([SEN-
ATE REPORT supra note 5 at 20, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws] at 30).
Atari's Motion to Separate Count II of the Verified Complaint, 2-3 (December 19, 1983). This
position was advocated in The New Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit, 37 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y.
732, 749-50 (1982).
This position, however, ignores the remainder of the sentence quoted from the legislative his-
tory. The sentence says that District judges should use the procedural devices to separate "trivial
patent claims, counterclaims, cross claims, or third party claims raised to manipulate jurisdiction."
SENATE REPORT supra note 5 at 20, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 30. The section gives
no authority to the position that non-trivial claims should be separated. See supra note 54.
64. Though Atari in its motion requested that the court separate Count II for trial and judg-
ment, the court order stated only that Atari was "granted leave toseparate [sic] Count II of the
Verified Complaint." Order of December 21, 1983. The CAFC, however, held that this inconsis-
tency was unrelated to the decision on jurisdiction. 747 F.2d at 1426.
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appeal. 65 The CAFC elected, sua sponte, to consider the transfer motion
en banc and invited submission of supplemental briefs from the parties
and briefs amicus curiae from interested persons and organizations. 66
The CAFC denied the motion to transfer the appeal and held that the
case was properly in that court. The court also held that the law of the
Seventh Circuit would apply to non-patent issues.
REASONING OF THE COURT
The court indicated that Atari's motion to transfer raised a single
issue.67 The issue was the effect of a separation order on the CAFC's
jurisdiction.
The court noted that because a statute defines the jurisdiction of the
CAFC, the plain language of the statute is the clearest indication of the
court's jurisdiction. 68 The statute states that the CAFC has jurisdiction
over an appeal when the jurisdiction of the district court "was based, in
whole or in part, on Section 1338 of this title, except in a case involving
. . . copyrights or trademarks and no other claims under Section
1338(a)." 69 Looking at this language, the court held that it was obvious
65. 747 F.2d at 1427. This motion was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 which was added to Title
28 by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 2 (1982).
§ 1631. Transfer to cure want of jurisdiction.
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this title or an
appeal, including a petition for review of administrative action, is noticed for or filed with
such a court and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is
in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which the
action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed, and the action
or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the court to which it is
transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in or noticed for the court from
which it is transferred.
28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1982).
66. After disposition of Atari's motion to transfer the appeal, the parties reached a settlement.
The complaint and counterclaims were dismissed on stipulation of the parties, and JS&A dismissed
its appeal.
67. 747 F.2d at 1427.
68. Id. at 1429 (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)).
69. The pertinent portion of the jurisdictional statute reads:
(a) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive
jurisdiction -
(1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States, the
United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of
Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or the District Court for the Northern
Mariana Islands, if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section
1338 of this title, except that a case involving a claim arising under any Act of Congress
relating to copyrights or trademarks and no other claims under section 1338(a) shall be
governed by sections 1291, 1292, and 1294 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1982).
Section 1338 provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
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that the controlling factor was whether the district court's jurisdiction
was based in part on section 1338.70 Because the complaint stated a
claim for patent infringement as well as a claim for contributory copy-
right infringement, the statutory exception did not apply in the instant
case.
7 1
The court next examined whether the separation order had any ef-
fect on CAFC jurisdiction over the appeal. The court flatly rejected the
contention that the separation affected its jurisdiction. The court gave
four reasons for its decision. First, the separation order under Rule
42(b)72 is procedural, not substantive and therefore does not affect juris-
diction.73 Second, Rule 42(b) does not sever claims but merely separates
the claims temporarily.74 Third, there was no authority for the use of
Rule 42(b) to route appeals to different circuits. 75 Fourth, despite the
separation order, there was only one case. All that the separation order
changed was the sequence and timing of the trial.76
Significantly, the CAFC determined that its "potential subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to hear any appeal in this case arose under the statute
when Atari filed its complaint seeking an exercise of the district court's
jurisdiction on its patent claim under § 1338." 77 The court rejected the
trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant
variety protection and copyright cases.
(b) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a
claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the
copyright, patent, plant variety protection of trade-mark laws.
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982).
70. 747 F.2d at 1429.
71. Id. The court noted that Atari cited 28 U.S.C. § 1338 in the complaint as a basis for
jurisdiction. Also, the court noted that Atari invoked subject matter jurisdiction under section
1338(a) when it included counts alleging copyright infringement and patent infringement.
The court never made clear if it as a significant factor that Atari cited section 1338. However,
the court's reasoning in this and in other cases would seem to indicate that mere citation of section
1338 would not be a factor in determining jurisdiction. See Beghin-Say Int'l, Inc. v. Ole-Bendt
Rasmussen, 733 F.2d 1568, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that a party cannot create § 1338
jurisdiction by merely alleging that the action seeks a declaration of invalidity); Chemical Eng'g
Corp. v. Mario, Inc., 754 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the CAFC can recharacterize
pleadings which manipulate jurisdiction).
72. Rule 42(b) provides:
(b) Separate Trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice,
or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate
trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issues
or any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always
preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States.
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
73. 747 F.2d at 1430 (citing Richmond v. Weiner, 353 F.2d 41, 44-45 (9th Cir. 1965)).
74. 747 F.2d at 1430.





contention that the CAFC's jurisdiction should be determined by the
case's status at the time the appeal is filed.78  The court stated that the
time of filing of the appeal is not the proper time to determine appellate
jurisdiction because the statute predicates CAFC jurisdiction on district
court jurisdiction and district court jurisdiction is measured at the outset
of the case.79 Likewise, the CAFC held that its appellate jurisdiction was
measured at the outset of the suit and was unaffected by later events.8 0
The CAFC pointed out that the critical question was whether the
district court's jurisdiction was based on section 1338. Further, relying
on past CAFC decisions,81 the court held that no matter what the com-
plaint indicated, the nature of the suit could indicate that jurisdiction
was actually based on section 1338. Jurisdiction was determined by the
nature of the allegations in the complaint filed.8 2
After examining the literal language of the statute, the CAFC exten-
sively reviewed the legislative history to determine if it confirmed the
court's reading of the statute. Noting that the legislative history sup-
ported the idea that trivial or frivolous patent claims added only to ma-
nipulate appellate jurisdiction should be separated by the district
courts,8 3 the court found no indication of a frivolous or trivial patent
count.8 4 The court found it incongruous to suppose that Congress sup-
ported the idea of appellate forum shopping by allowing separation of
non-trivial patent claims.8 5
Looking at the four problems which Congress sought to avoid,8 6 the
78. Id. at 1432.
79. Id. at 1431 (relying on Albert v. Kevex Corp., 729 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
80. 747 F.2d at 1431-32.
81. Chemical Eng'g Corp. v. Marlo, Inc., 754 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Snap-On Tools
Corp., 720 F.2d 654 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
82. 747 F.2d at 1432-33. To support this statement the court quoted Mr. Frank Cihlar, one of
the drafters of the Federal Courts Improvement Act.
We did our best. . . to try to provide in new 28 U.S.C. § 1295 a 'bright line' that would
establish at the outset of the case whether any appeal would lie to the CAFC or to the
regional circuit, much as 28 U.S.C. § 1294 now provides a way to sort out venue among the
existing circuits.
94 F.R.D. 350, 400 (Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, May 25, 1982).
83. 747 F.2d at 1433-34. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
84. Id. at 1434.
85. The court indicated that:
Indeed, it would be incongruous to suppose that a Congress concerned with avoiding
appellate forum shopping through manipulative joining of trivial and frivolous patent
counts would have intended to permit appellate forum shopping by the manipulative sepa-
ration of a non-frivolous patent count attempted in the present case.
• * * Our jurisdiction is not dependent on the mere whim of counsel. It is settled by
statute and confirmed in the legislative history.
Id. (emphasis in original).
86. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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court concluded that the only way to meet all the intentions of Congress
was for the CAFC to hear the appeal but to apply Seventh Circuit law to
the copyright issue. The court stated that if the appeal was transferred to
the Seventh Circuit, the problem of CAFC appropriation would be
avoided. The problems of bifurcation, specialization and forum shop-
ping, however, would not be avoided. If the CAFC heard the case but
did not apply Seventh Circuit law, forum shopping would be encouraged
and the CAFC would begin to-appropriate other issues. The CAFC thus
denied the motion to transfer the appeal and held that Seventh Circuit
law would be applied.8 7
Reviewing past CAFC decisions which applied the law of other cir-
cuits,8 8 the court stated that "[t]he concept of a circuit looking in this
case to the established, discernable law of the involved circuit is unique,
but no more unique than is this court and the congressional pioneering
that created it.' '89 The court ordered the parties to submit briefs on the
merits in view of the Seventh Circuit law. The CAFC panel was to sit as
though it was a panel of the Seventh Circuit.90
Two separate opinions, concurring in result,91 indicated that the
case should be decided on the narrow issue at hand and that the broad
dicta of the opinion was unwarranted.
ANALYSIS
The decision of the CAFC to hear this appeal but to apply Seventh
Circuit law to the non-patent issues is a unique solution to the jurisdic-
tional problem presented. Both the literal language of the statute and the
legislative history support the Federal Circuit's decision to hear the ap-
peal. By holding that Seventh Circuit law would apply to the non-patent
issues, the CAFC adopted a solution which avoids all of the problems
with which Congress was concerned.92
87. 747 F.2d at 1440-41.
88. In Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 908-09 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
decided the same day as Atari, the CAFC found that it had jurisdiction over an appeal based on
trademark law where the patent issues were being separately appealed. In the trademark portion of
the case the court looked to Ninth Circuit law. In W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Int'l Med. Prosthet-
ics Research Assoc., Inc., 745 F.2d 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the court applied Ninth Circuit law. In
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the court held
that two different sets of procedural requirements should not be imposed on the district courts. In In
re Int'l Medical Prosthetics Research Assoc., Inc., 739 F.2d 618, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the court held
that procedural questions should not have different answers depending on whether an appeal would
lay to the CAFC or to the regional circuit.
89. 747 F.2d at 1440.
90. The appeal, however, was never heard. See supra note 66.
91. 747 F.2d at 1440-41 (Friedman, J., and Davis, J., concurring in result).
92. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problem areas.
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The opinion in Atari is separable into two parts. First is the disposi-
tion of Atari's motion to transfer the appeal. Second is the broad lan-
guage which hints at answers to a large number of other jurisdictional
issues. The breadth of the opinion is not surprising for two reasons:
(1) this was the first opportunity for the CAFC to extensively interpret
its jurisdictional statute; and (2) the amicus briefs requested by the court
and submitted by ten different organizations tended to address general
jurisdictional questions rather than the issue at bar.93 The concurring
judges argued that the majority opinion went too far,94 and indeed the
major criticism of the opinion is that, while it purports to discuss a single
issue, the dicta in the opinion is very broad and hints at answers to juris-
dictional questions other than the issue presented.
The essence of the test put forward by the Atari court is that the
Federal Circuit has "arising under" jurisdiction of an entire case, and
once appellate jurisdiction is established in the CAFC, further proce-
dural actions cannot defeat CAFC jurisdiction. 95 The test operates as a
sort of one-way valve. 96 Once jurisdiction is established, further action
cannot defeat CAFC jurisdiction over that case.97 Furthermore, by
adopting the "arising under" language, 98 the court adopts a theory of
jurisdiction which is widely used and construed.99
The jurisdictional test t0 set forth by the Atari court can be broken
into a three part test. First, the court must determine whether the juris-
diction of the district court is based, in whole or in part, on section
1338.101 If the district court's jurisdiction is not based on section 1338,
then the Federal Circuit does not have jurisdiction. Second, the court
93. 747 F.2d at 1427 n. 2. See Kingdon and Moradian, supra note 14, for a discussion of the
positions advocated by the amici. As the court noted and the article suggests, the amici split 50/50
on the issue at bar with the patent amici advocating denial of the motion to transfer and the non-
patent amici advocating transfer. See also infra notes 105-119 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of some of the positions advocated.
94. 747 F.2d at 1440-41 (Friedman, J., and Davis J., concurring in result in separate opinions.).
95. Id. at 1431.
96. F. Cihlar & J. Goldstein, Comments at the program Practicing Before the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (April 1, 1985).
97. 747 F.2d at 1431-32. The court indicated that the criteria for district court jurisdiction are
determined at the complaint stage and that further procedural actions which do not alter those
criteria would not alter appellate jurisdiction.
98. Congress also used the arising under language. "Cases will be within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the same sense that cases are said to 'arise under' federal
law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction." HOUSE REPORT supra note 48 at 41.
99. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 17, 18 (4th ed. 1983).
100. This test applies only to jurisdiction conferred on the Federal Circuit by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1).
101. The Federal Circuit has held that it has jurisdiction to determine whether a district court is
correct in deciding that there was not § 1338 jurisdiction. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
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must determine if there is a claim in the case which arose under any Act
of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection.102 If there is
no patent or plant variety protection claim, then the Federal Circuit does
not have jurisdiction. Third, the court must determine if the patent or
plant variety protection count which is present in the cases was frivo-
lously pled. If the claim is frivolous, then the Federal Circuit does not
have jurisdiction. 103
This test has the advantage of being straightforward and easy to ap-
ply. It also comports with both the literal language of the statute and
with the legislative history. When a case "arises under" the patent laws
(at least in part) then the CAFC has potential appellate jurisdiction over
the entire case. The CAFC may hear an appeal which addresses only
non-patent issues even when the underlying patent claim is not present
on appeal. However, on these non-patent issues, the CAFC will apply
the established discernable law of the regional circuit in which the dis-
trict court sat. 10 4
Other tests have been proposed to determine Federal Circuit juris-
diction. One amicus 10 5 proposed that CAFC jurisdiction should be mea-
sured at the time the appeal is filed. 10 6 The Atari court squarely rejected
this idea.10 7 It is obvious that the CAFC does not actually have jurisdic-
tion until an appeal is filed. But, under the Atari test, the CAFC acquires
prospective jurisdiction at the initiation of the suit if the case arises under
the patent laws. This prospective jurisdiction ripens into actual jurisdic-
tion when an appeal is filed. 108
Another amicus brieft 09 and two articles 10 suggested that the
CAFC have jurisdiction over patent issues and other issues which are
102. While the second part of the test is closely related to the first part, it is best to separate the
two parts. The district court can have § 1338 jurisdiction if there is a claim which arises under any
Act of Congress in four areas: patent, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. How-
ever, in § 1295(a)(1) there is an exception to the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit for cases which
arise under any Act of Congress relating to copyrights or trademarks and no other claims under
§ 1338. Therefore, for the Federal Circuit to have jurisdiction over the appeal there must be a claim
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection.
103. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
104. The Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Section of the American Bar Association has sug-
gested legislation which would have the effect of holding that the CAFC is not bound by law of the
regional circuits on non-patent issues. However, as written, the CAFC would still have the discre-
tion to apply the law of the regional circuits.
105. The United States Trademark Association.
106. Brief of amicus curiae, The United States Trademark Association at 2.
107. 747 F.2d at 1432.
108. Id. at 1431.
109. Brief of amicus curiae, The Committee on Patents of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York.
110. Adams, supra note 21, at 73; The New Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, supra note
63 at 748-50.
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related to the patent issues. Under this test, appeals of issues that are
unrelated to the patent issues would be heard by the regional courts of
appeals. While the Atari court did not directly reject this test, the court
indicated that nothing in the statute requires such relatedness for the
CAFC to have jurisdiction.I 1'
Three amici advocated the use of separation orders under Rule 42 to
affect the jurisdiction of the CAFC. 112 The Atari decision clearly takes a
contrary position. While the court indicated that in the instant case it
was not clear that the patent court was separated for trial and judg-
ment, 113 the court held that Rule 42(b) separation orders did not affect
its jurisdiction." 14 There was, however, some language in the decision
which indicated that if an action were severed into two cases, not just
separated as in Rule 42(b), the CAFC would not have jurisdiction over
the non-patent case. 15
Another test suggested by an amicus was the "dominance of the
issue" test. 16 Under this formulation, a case is to be examined and the
dominant issue determined. If the dominant issue is not a patent issue,
then the CAFC does not have jurisdiction. This test is clearly contrary
to the statute. The statute makes no mention of whether the patent claim
is or is not dominant. If a case is based even in part on the patent laws,
the statute clearly gives the CAFC jurisdiction.
Finally, one author 1 7 suggested that the proper test would deter-
mine whether a non-patent issue is primarily unaffected by a decision on
a patent issue. If an issue is primarily unaffected, then it would be heard
by the regional court of appeals. This test is to be applied so that patent
issues, whether in a claim, cross-claim or counterclaim, will be decided
by the CAFC, while non-patent issues will be decided by the regional
circuits." 8 This test, like several of the other tests suggested, ignores the
express congressional intention not to give the CAFC merely issue juris-
diction and to avoid bifurcation of appeals.' 19
111. 747 F.2d at 1428.
112. Brief of amicus curiae the Bar Association of the District of Columbia; Brief of the Comit-
tee on Law and Technology of the Boston Bar Association as amicus curiae; Comments of amicus
curiae an Ad Hoc Committee of Antitrust Lawyers on the Proper Scope of Jurisdiction of the Vari-
ous Circuit Courts of Appeals.
113. 747 F.2d at 1431.
114. Id. at 1430.
115. Id. See Kingdom and Moredian, supra note 14, at 18 for a discussion of this point.
116. Comments of amicus curiae the U.S. Copyright Office.
117. Note, An Appraisal of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 301,
322-23 (1984).
118. Id.
119. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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The test set forth by the Atari court is superior to any of the alterna-
tive tests suggested. None of the other tests satisfy all of the congres-
sional intentions as well as the Atari test does. It remains to be seen
however, how the courts will apply this test to other situations.
Using the Atari test, the following hypothetical situations would be
decided in the following ways: (1) When a patent claim is withdrawn
with prejudice before appeal, CAFC jurisdiction; 20 (2) When a patent
claim has been dismissed as frivolous and the dismissal is not appealed,
regional circuit jurisdiction; 121 (3) when a patent infringement counter-
claim is asserted, but the complaint has only non-patent counts, regional
circuit jurisdiction; 122 (4) when there are separate cases, which arise from
the same nucleus of operative facts, but have not been consolidated,
CAFC jurisdiction for the case that has a patent claim and regional court
jurisdiction for the non-patent case;123 and (5) when a complaint is
amended to include a patent claim, CAFC jurisdiction. 124
The preceding predictions must be tempered by three caveats. First,
it is clear from the legislative history that trivial or frivolous patent
claims should not give the CAFC jurisdiction. Second, the Atari opinion
is sufficiently vague to allow the CAFC to determine any of the hypothet-
ical situations discussed above either way without overruling the opinion.
Third, the facts of Atari make it an easy decision. In Atari, the separa-
tion order's sole purpose was an attempt to defeat CAFC jurisdiction.
The CAFC's decision was made easier by that blatant attempt at forum
shopping.
CONCLUSION
In Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., the CAFC followed the congres-
sional mandate to formulate appropriate jurisdictional standards. The
CAFC, in a broad opinion, decided that a separation order did not affect
its jurisdiction and that the established discernable law of the Seventh
Circuit was the appropriate law to apply to non-patent issues. The
120. The CAFC would have jurisdiction since the district court's jurisdiction was based on
§ 1338. The withdrawal of the claim would not affect the district court's jurisdiction since it would
occur after a decision by the district court.
121. Frivolous claims will not create CAFC jurisdiction. See supra note 54 and accompanying
text.
122. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a defense or counterclaim will not support federal
jurisdiction. Therefore there would be no § 1338 jurisdiction. See J. FRIENDENTHAL, M. KANE &
A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.4 (1985).
123. Because the cases are separate, they would have independent jurisdictional grounds.
124. Under the amended complaint, there would be CAFC jurisdiction. The original complaint
will have been superseded. These predictions are based, in part on F. Cihlar & J. Goldstein, Com-
ments at the program Practicing Before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (April 1, 1985).
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CAFC indicated that its jurisdiction was determined by reference to the
complaint to discern if the case arose under the patent laws.
The CAFC's decision in Atari is a unique solution to the jurisdic-
tional problem presented. The court balanced the competing interests
and formulated a test which accommodates the literal language of the
statute as well as congressional intentions. Only the future will tell how
the CAFC interprets this opinion and whether it will remain viable in
other situations at other times.

